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A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO OBSERVE 
ELECTIONS: FULFILLING THE DREAM OF 
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS BY EXTENDING IT TO 
THE POLLING PLACE 
Andrew D. Howell+ 
The First Amendment not only protects the right to speak, but also the right 
to gather information.1  When evaluating whether the public has a presumptive 
constitutional right to access a government process, either by itself or via the 
press, courts use the “experience and logic” test first described in Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.2  This test, which has been further developed since 
Richmond Newspapers was decided, determined a presumptive First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials, and has subsequently been applied 
by lower courts in civil trials and administrative proceedings.3 
The Third and Sixth Circuits, however, disagree as to whether certain 
administrative proceedings pass the “experience and logic” test, and whether the 
press has a presumptive right of access to the polling place.4  In 2004, the Sixth 
Circuit held that the press has a presumptive right of access to the polling place, 
although it is not clear whether the Sixth Circuit fully engaged the “experience 
and logic” test.5  However, in 2013, the Third Circuit held that the press does 
not have a right of access to the polling place, finding the “experience and logic” 
test unsatisfied.6  By examining the history of access to the polling place as well 
                                                          
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2009, The College of William and Mary.  The author extends his deep gratitude to Professor 
William Wagner for his insightful comments and guidance during the drafting of this Comment, as 
well as Professor Wagner’s excellent instruction in constitutional law.  The author also expresses 
his thanks and appreciation to his family and friends who have encouraged him during all of his 
law school endeavors, including the drafting of this Comment.  Finally, the author extends his 
sincere thanks to the staff members of the Catholic University Law Review for their patience and 
meticulous work during the writing and editing process of this Comment. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see infra Part I.A–B. 
 2. 448 U.S. 555 (1980); see infra Part I.C. 
 3. See infra Part I.C. 
 4. Compare PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming the 
constitutionality of a state statute restricting the media’s access to the polling place), and N. Jersey 
Media Grp. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that there is no First Amendment 
right of access to deportation proceedings), with Beacon Journal Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Blackwell, 389 
F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming the right of access to the polling place for news gatherings 
and reporting), and Detroit Free Press Corp. v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682–83 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(affirming that a blanket closure of deportation proceedings is unconstitutional). 
 5. See infra Part I.F.1. 
 6. See infra notes 135–49 and accompanying text. 
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as the public interest in access, this Comment evaluates and argues that the two-
part “experience and logic” test is satisfied.7 
This Comment begins by providing a broad overview of certain rights and 
protections afforded by the First Amendment, including the rights to speak and 
gather information.  Next, to determine if a qualified presumptive First 
Amendment right of access to the polls exists, this Comment highlights Supreme 
Court and subsequent lower court jurisprudence applying the “experience and 
logic” test to governmental proceedings.  This Comment then proceeds to 
explain current state laws concerning access to the polling place for individuals 
not specifically there to vote.  Examining the already robust history of openness 
of the polls to “outsiders,”8 and analogizing the public interests at stake in the 
polling place with those at stake in other governmental processes, Part II of this 
Comment argues that when the “experience and logic” test is applied to instances 
of media access to the polling place, the test is satisfied, creating a presumptive 
First Amendment right of media access to the polls.  Such a presumptive right 
of access does not have to ignite mayhem at the polling place that critics may 
fear, as reasonable restrictions can be placed on rights of access, so long as strict 
scrutiny is satisfied. 
I.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS THE RIGHT TO SPEAK AND THE RIGHT TO 
GATHER INFORMATION 
A.  The First Amendment Protects the Right to Free Expression 
The First Amendment is described by one commentator as “form[ing] the 
foundation for what many consider to be defining American traits: 
individualism, boundless creative expression, and the spirit of protest.”9  It 
states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”10  As part of the Bill of Rights, the 
First Amendment was enacted to serve as a check on the power of the new 
Congress.11  The first word of this well-known amendment, notably, is 
“Congress.”12  The First Amendment, similar to much of the rest of the Bill of 
                                                          
 7. See infra Part II.  Although issues of voting rights and its jurisprudence are discussed, this 
Comment is not meant to serve as a comprehensive examination of these topics.  See infra notes 
187–208 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Part II.B.1.a–c. 
 9. Jon G. Furlow, The Price of Free Speech, WIS. LAW. (2000), http://www.wisbar.org/ 
newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?volume=73&issue=6&articleid=19758. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 11. See Ronald K.L. Collins, The Speech & Press Clauses of the First Amendment, 29 DEL. 
LAW. 8, 9 (2012) (noting the fears that gave rise to the drafting of the Bill of Rights and the First 
Amendment). 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Rights, is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.13  
On its face, the First Amendment, among other rights, protects the right to speak 
freely.14  It, nonetheless, protects more than the rights specifically enumerated 
within it.15 
B.  An Implicit “Right to Listen” Exists Within the First Amendment 
Courts have consistently held that the First Amendment includes a freedom to 
listen to and receive information.16  This right developed out of the First 
Amendment because the freedom to listen to and receive information promotes 
“the marketplace of ideas.”17  The “marketplace of ideas,” first described by 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United States,18 
“represents one of the most powerful images of free speech, both for legal 
thinkers and for laypersons.”19  Justice Brandeis later embraced this concept, 
writing: 
[The Founding Fathers] believed that freedom to think as you will and 
to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly 
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious 
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that 
                                                          
 13. See Collins, supra note 11, at 9–10; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 
(1925) (holding that freedoms of speech and the press fall within fundamental liberties protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment).  The Supreme Court has incorporated nearly all of the Bill of 
Rights amendments against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Jessica A. Roth, The 
Anomaly of Entrapment, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 979, 989 (2014); see, e.g., McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms 
against the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures and its exclusionary rule 
against states). 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 15. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“This right to receive information and 
ideas, regardless of their social worth is fundamental to our free society.”) (citation omitted). 
 17. See Clay Calvert & Mirelis Torres, Staring Death in the Face During Times of War: When 
Ethics, Law, and Self-Censorship in the News Media Hide the Morbidity of Authenticity, 25 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 87, 102 (2011) (citing MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE 
SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001)); 
Peter J. Ferrera & Carlos S. Ramirez, The Constitutional Freedom to Listen, 6 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 
1, 5–6 (2011). 
 18. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 19. Id. at 630 (“But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that 
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the 
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”); See Ferrera & Ramirez, supra 
note 17, at 5; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1, 
2–3 (1984). 
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public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
fundamental principle of the American government.20 
Tracing back to John Stuart Mill and John Milton,21 the “marketplace of 
ideas” theory of free speech provides, among other things, constitutional 
limitations on the rights of public officials to sue for damages in defamation 
cases22 and allows First Amendment protections for commercial speech.23  Thus, 
in the same manner that the “best product” ultimately wins in the economic 
marketplace, “the truth or the best policy arises out of the competition of 
alternative ideas in free public debate, with the listening public free to determine 
the truth out of that clash of ideas.”24  Justice Powell, overturning a state law 
significantly restricting the ability of corporations to spend money promoting 
political positions, summarized the idea of the so-called “marketplace of ideas,” 
writing: “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-
expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of 
information from which members of the public may draw.”25  Essentially, the 
right to speak freely fuels a parallel right to gather freely information about 
which one will speak.26 
C.  Richmond Newspapers and Its Progeny Grant a Presumptive 
Constitutional First Amendment Right of Access to Criminal Trials to the 
Public and Press 
1.  Richmond Newspapers Puts a Constitutional Right of Access Into Action 
Richmond Newspapers concerned a Virginia statute relied upon by the trial 
judge that allowed a criminal trial to be closed to the public upon a defendant’s 
                                                          
 20. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 21. See Ingber, supra note 19, at 3. 
 22. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1968). 
The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official 
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 
Id.; see also Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967) (extending the “public 
official” doctrine of New York Times v. Sullivan to “public figures”). 
 23. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
761–65 (1976). 
 24. See Ferrera & Ramirez, supra note 17, at 4–5; see also Ingber, supra note 19, at 3. 
This theory assumes that a process of robust debate, if uninhibited by governmental 
interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best perspectives or 
solutions for societal problems.  A properly functioning marketplace of ideas, in 
Holmes’s perspective, ultimately assures the proper evolution of society, wherever that 
evolution might lead. 
Id. 
 25. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978). 
 26. See id. 
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motion without a showing of a compelling need for closure.27  In the disputed 
trial, the trial judge ordered that the press and public were to be barred from the 
courtroom.28  After Richmond Newspapers, Inc. was granted the right to 
intervene nunc pro tunc, it “petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for writs of 
mandamus and prohibition and filed an appeal from the trial court’s closure 
order.”29  The Virginia Supreme Court denied each request, and the case was 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.30 
Rejecting any suggestion of mootness,31 the Supreme Court reviewed the 
history of the criminal trial in both English and American law.32  Noting the 
unquestionable history of criminal trials being open to the public in both the 
United States and England, from Norman feudal rule to early colonial Virginia, 
the Court stressed the societal importance of maintaining open criminal trials 
and concluded “that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a 
criminal trial under our system of justice.”33 
The Court also noted that the attendance of the public at criminal trials not 
only satisfies a need for members of the public to see justice carried out fairly, 
but also for a sort of “community catharsis” of emotions, especially for trials 
addressing particularly heinous crimes.34  The Court, going as far as to label 
media members attending criminal trials as “surrogates for the public,” indicated 
that with the rise of technology in the modern world, as well as changes in 
modern society, the public through the vehicle of the press often obtains news 
and information about trials.35  “People in an open society,” the Court explained, 
“do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to 
accept what they are prohibited from observing.”36 
Ultimately, the Court held that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in 
the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, 
which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of 
speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’”37  Despite establishing 
presumptive openness to the public for criminal trials, the Court was careful to 
                                                          
 27. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 561, 564 (1980). 
 28. Id. at 561.  The jury ultimately found the defendant not guilty.  Id. at 562. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 563. 
 32. See id. at 564–70. 
 33. Id. at 567–73. 
 34. See id. at 570–72. 
 35. See id. at 572–73. 
 36. Id. at 572. 
 37. Id. at 580 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). 
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clarify that a presumptive right of the public to attend trials (whether directly or 
via the press) was not absolute.38 
The public, accordingly, has what is described as a qualified First Amendment 
right of access to criminal trials, relying upon a test of “logic and experience.”39  
Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, articulated the inquiry necessary to inspect 
the applicability of this qualified right.40  First, drawing upon the majority’s 
examination of historical practices, Justice Brennan identified judicial 
experience as a prong.41  Second, Justice Brennan expounded that “the value of 
access must be measured in specifics,” thereby fashioning an individualized 
logical prong aimed at considering the “particular government process” and its 
importance as it relates to the “terms of that very process.”42  Brennan’s 
concurrence, and not the plurality opinion, soon thereafter operated as the 
precedential opinion.43 
2.  Globe Newspaper Co. Clearly Names the Richmond Newspapers 
“Experience and Logic” Test 
Only two years later, Justice Brennan, by definitively labeling his prior test in 
his Richmond Newspapers concurrence as one of “logic and experience,” 
explained the rationale for presumptive openness of criminal trials.44  In Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk,45 the Court reiterated that the 
                                                          
 38. See id. at 581 n.18 (“[O]ur holding today does not mean that the First Amendment rights 
of the public and representatives of the press are absolute. . . .  [A] trial judge, in the interest of the 
fair administration of justice, [may] impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial.”). 
 39. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44 (1984); see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 
at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult 
historical and current practice with respect to open trials, and weigh the importance of public access 
to the trial process itself.”). 
 40. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
First, the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and 
vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information.  Such a tradition 
commands respect in part because the Constitution carries the gloss of history.  More 
importantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience.  
Second, the value of access must be measured in specifics.  Analysis is not advanced by 
rhetorical statements that all information bears upon public issues; what is crucial in 
individual cases is whether access to a particular government process is important in 
terms of that very process.  To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult 
historical and current practice with respect to open trials, and weigh the importance of 
public access to the trial process itself. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Harlan Grant Cohen, The (Un)favorable Judgment of History: Deportation Hearings, 
the Palmer Raids, and the Meaning of History, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1431, 1441 (2003) (noting the 
Court’s movement away from a historical analysis dating back to the Norman conquests, and 
instead focusing on matters exclusively after the Bill of Rights). 
 44. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). 
 45. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
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presumptive openness at trials, while a constitutional right, was not absolute.46  
In writing for the Court, Justice Brennan made clear that when the prongs of 
logic and experience are satisfied, as they are presumptively in the case of a 
criminal trial,47 restrictions on the ability of the public or press to access a trial 
must be evaluated under strict scrutiny.48 
Ultimately, the Court held that a mandatory closure rule,49 even for the 
testimony of minors who were victims of sexual abuse, could not satisfy strict 
scrutiny.50  The Globe Newspaper Court mandated that speculative arguments 
in support of closure, without sustaining empirical evidence, would not justify 
closing a criminal proceeding.51 
3.  Press-Enterprise I Continues the Trend of Presumptive Openness Found 
in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper 
Two years after Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise I)52 evaluated a law of 
presumptive closure of voir dire procedures to the public and press.53  Press-
Enterprise, excluded from voir dire by a law mandating presumptive closure, 
sought the release of transcripts from the closed portions of the voir dire hearing, 
a request denied by the trial judge.54  The Supreme Court, again stressing the 
strict scrutiny standard, emphasized that there must be a case-by-case analysis 
before closing criminal proceedings to the press and public.55  Such a 
requirement, the Court reasoned, helps ensure the existence of a compelling 
reason for closure.56 
4.  Press-Enterprise II Solidifies the Test of “Experience and Logic” 
In 1986, Press-Enterprise, hoping to compel public disclosure of transcripts 
from a forty-one day preliminary hearing in the murder trial of Robert Diaz, 
again challenged the Superior Court of California in Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise II).57   The California Supreme 
                                                          
 46. Id. at 606. 
 47. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 48. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07 (“Where, as in the present case, the State attempts 
to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be 
shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.”). 
 49. See id. at 598 (stating that Massachusetts law requires trial judges to exclude the press 
and public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim in a sexual offense case). 
 50. Id. at 607–09. 
 51. Id. at 609–10. 
 52. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
 53. See id. at 503. 
 54. Id. at 503–04. 
 55. See id. at 509–11. 
 56. See id. at 511–12. 
 57. 478 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1986). 
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Court held that preliminary hearings were not governed by the Richmond 
Newspapers test, theorizing that a preliminary hearing is not a criminal trial.58  
The Court hinted that the “logic and experience” test should extend beyond 
criminal trials, stating, “the First Amendment question cannot be resolved solely 
on the label we give the event, i.e., ‘trial’ or otherwise, particularly where the 
preliminary hearing functions much like a full-scale trial.”59  The Court 
explained that as with criminal trials, there is a long history of openness of 
preliminary trials.60   The openness of such hearings, the Court continued, fosters 
both fairness and the public perception of fairness, just like the open nature of a 
criminal trial.61  Reiterating its previous definitions of the “experience” and 
“logic” prongs,62 the Press-Enterprise II Court summarized its jurisprudence on 
the issue: 
These considerations of experience and logic are, of course, related, 
for history and experience shape the functioning of governmental 
processes.  If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests 
of experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public 
access attaches.  But even when a right of access attaches, it is not 
absolute.63 
The Press-Enterprise II Court clarified that for closure of a criminal 
proceeding, there must be “specific findings” by a court that an unfair trial will 
occur without closure and that no other means will suffice to protect the 
defendant’s interests.64 
5.  El Vocero Holds that the Label of “Trial” Is Not Necessary 
In El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico,65 the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that the existence of a “trial,” or at least the explicit label of one, is not 
dispositive when determining whether a governmental procedure is 
presumptively open to the public and press.66  A local newspaper challenged a 
                                                          
 58. Id. at 5–7. 
 59. Id. at 7–9. 
 60. See id. at 10–11. 
 61. Id. at 11–13. 
 62. Id. at 8 (noting that the experience prong looks to “whether the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public,” while the logic prong examines “whether 
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question”). 
 63. Id. at 9 (emphasis added); see also Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News: 
A Sequential Interpretation of the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 141–
42 (2008). 
 64. Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 13–14. (“[T]he proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, 
on the record findings are made demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to preserve higher values 
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’”) (quoting Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 
464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). 
 65. 508 U.S. 147 (1993). 
 66. Id. 149–50. 
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Puerto Rico law closing preliminary hearings for accused criminals.67  As such, 
the key inquiry under El Vocero and Press-Enterprise II is not whether this 
proceeding is labeled a trial, but instead whether the proceeding functions like a 
trial.68  Moreover, the Court clarified that the experience analysis is not 
jurisdictionally dependent.69  The experience prong of the Richmond 
Newspapers inquiry, the Court explained, must consider the “whole North 
American experience, not just the tradition of the local state or territory.”70  
Ultimately, Puerto Rico’s rule that a preliminary hearing in a criminal trial was 
presumptively closed, unless the defendant moved otherwise, was overturned as 
contrary to the First Amendment right of access.71 
D.  The First Amendment Right of Access Provides Greater Protection of 
Public Interests Than the Common Law Right of Access 
In addition to the First Amendment right of access that is the centerpiece of 
this Comment, a common law presumptive right of access to public records and 
documents also exists.72  Courts generally hold that this common law 
presumptive right of access imparts a lower form of protection than the First 
Amendment right of access.73  Unlike a First Amendment right of access, a 
common law presumption of access may be defeated upon a mere showing that 
interests in preventing public disclosure of the information are greater than the 
public’s interest in accessing it.74 
The common law presumptive right of access, while not the focus of this 
Comment, often overlaps with the First Amendment presumptive right of access, 
and courts often consider them together.75 
                                                          
 67. Id. at 148–49. 
 68. See id. at 149–50. 
 69. See Richard J. Peltz et. al., The Arkansas Proposal on Access to Court Records: 
Upgrading the Common Law with Electronic Freedom of Information Norms, 59 ARK. L. REV. 
555, 607 n.310 (2006). 
 70. Id. 
 71. El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. at 151. 
 72. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (“It is clear that 
the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and 
documents, including judicial records and documents.”); see also Joe Regalia, The Common Law 
Right to Information, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 89, 95–96 (2014). 
 73. See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(“The common law does not afford as much substantive protection to the interests of the press and 
the public as does the First Amendment.  Under common law, there is a presumption of access 
accorded to judicial records.  This presumption of access, however, can be rebutted if countervailing 
interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access.”) (citations omitted). 
 74. See id.  This lower burden is juxtaposed with the strict scrutiny requirement when the 
First Amendment right of access attaches.  See id.; see also Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of 
Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 509–10 (1984) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 
U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982)). 
 75. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Therefore, we 
hold that appellants . . . possess a common law right of access to civil trials.  Although we could 
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E.  Courts Extend “Experience and Logic” Outside the Narrow Confines of the 
Criminal Trial 
1.  Civil Trials Are Also Presumptively Open Under the “Experience and 
Logic” Test 
While the Supreme Court has hinted that the right of access should extend to 
civil trials, it has never specifically held that the public and press’s rights of 
access extend to civil trials.76  The Third Circuit recognized this in Publicker 
Industries, Inc. v. Cohen.77  Nevertheless, the Publicker court also found that an 
examination of the same authorities relied upon by the Richmond Newspapers 
Court in reaching its decision likewise established a long history of a common 
law right of access for the press to civil trials and proceedings.78 
The Publicker court then proceeded through a First Amendment analysis of 
access to civil proceedings, relying on the Richmond Newspapers “experience 
and logic” test and its progeny.79  Evaluating the history of public civil trials, the 
Publicker court identified a long history of public civil proceedings in both the 
English and American systems of justice.80  The public benefit to having civil 
trials open to the public, noted the Publicker court, includes: the increased 
likelihood of truthful testimony, the pressure on judicial officers to perform their 
duties properly under public scrutiny, and the public’s benefit of education about 
the workings of government.81 
                                                          
rest our decision on a common law right of access, the importance in guaranteeing freedoms at 
issue here compel us to reach the constitutional issues.”); see also United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 
194, 208 n.19 (3d. Cir. 2007) (citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981) (“The parties 
also dispute whether the media outlets have a First Amendment right to the [judicial] records. . . .  
Because we find that a common law right of access attaches to the [judicial] records, we need not 
engage in the First Amendment analysis.”); Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253 (“With regard to substantive 
requirements, we find it necessary to decide whether the interests of The Washington Post arise 
from the First Amendment or from the common law right of access.”). 
 76. See Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386–87 n.15 (1979) (“[I]n some civil 
cases the public interest in access, and the salutary effect of publicity, may be as strong as, or 
stronger than, in most criminal cases”); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555, 580 n.17 (1980) (“Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not 
raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been 
presumptively open.”); but see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 
611 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I interpret neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court’s 
decision today to carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials.”). 
 77. See 733 F.2d 1059, 1066–67 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. at 1067–68 (“Therefore, we must decide whether the Court’s analysis in Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. and in Globe Newspaper Co. leading to its recognition of a First Amendment 
guarantee of the public’s and press’ right of access to criminal trials is applicable to civil trials.”). 
 80. See id. at 1068–70. The Publicker court, for example, considered the writings of Sir 
Edward Coke, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir William Blackstone.  Id. 
 81. See id. at 1069–70 (stating that like criminal trials, access to civil trials “plays an important 
role in the participation and the free discussion of governmental affairs”). 
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The Publicker court determined the “experience and logic” test was satisfied, 
concluding that the First Amendment qualified right of access attaches and that 
civil trials are, presumptively, open to the public.82  As with criminal trials, the 
Publicker court made it clear that the right of access to civil proceedings is not 
absolute and could be restricted if a particular restriction on access survived 
strict scrutiny.83 
Other courts have also held that both the public and the press hold a qualified 
First Amendment right of access to proceedings in civil cases.84  The Sixth 
Circuit employed a similar rationale to the Third Circuit in Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC.85  The Fourth Circuit, relying on Richmond Newspapers 
and its progeny, including Publicker, found a First Amendment qualified right 
of access to documents filed in support of summary judgment motions.86  In 
reaching this holding, the Fourth Circuit noted that such motions were akin to 
“documents filed in connection with plea hearings and sentencing hearings in 
criminal cases,” which were the kind of documents the court previously 
understood to have attached a qualified First Amendment right of access.87 
2.  Courts Extend “Experience and Logic” to Government Processes in the 
Administrative State 
A circuit split remains, however, as to whether a presumptive right of access 
for the public and press attaches to administrative proceedings.88  Access to 
deportation hearings held in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks 
exemplify this circuit split.89  The Third and Sixth Circuits, while agreeing that 
                                                          
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 1070–71. 
 84. See NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 359 (Cal. 1999). 
[T]he high court has not accepted review of any of the numerous lower court cases that 
have found a general First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings, and we have 
not found a single lower court case holding that generally there is no First Amendment 
right of access to civil proceedings. 
Id. 
 85. 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he policy considerations discussed 
in Richmond Newspapers apply to civil as well as criminal cases”). 
 86. See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See infra Part I.E.2.a–c. 
 89. See Kathleen K. Miller, Do Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors? Finding a First 
Amendment Right of Access to Deportation Hearings by Re-evaluating the Richmond Newspapers 
Test, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646, 658 (2004) (noting how a revision in the way courts interpret 
the Richmond Newspapers test could resolve the circuit splits on deportation hearings); see also 
Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment and the Right of Access to Deportation Hearings, 40 
CAL. W.L. REV. 265, 268 (2004) (arguing that a First Amendment right of access to deportation 
hearings should exist). 
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a qualified right to access civil proceedings attaches,90 reached different 
conclusions on this particular matter.91 
a.  Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft: Deportation Hearings Are 
Presumptively Open 
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,92 the Sixth Circuit examined whether there 
was a First Amendment right of access to deportation hearings in light of the 
government’s closure of special interest deportation hearings following the 
September 11th terrorist attacks.93  Given Press-Enterprise II’s command that a 
strict label of “trial” is not required to apply the test, the Sixth Circuit applied 
the “experience and logic” test utilized by numerous courts to proceedings 
outside of criminal trials.94 
In applying the Richmond Newspapers test to the deportation hearings at 
issue, the Sixth Circuit found that a long history of openness measured in years 
alone was not dispositive of experience, and further found that hearings on 
deportation were traditionally open.95  First, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that no 
specific congressional intent to keep such hearings closed existed.96  It also noted 
the experience prong was satisfied by deportation hearings because they “‘walk, 
talk, and squawk’ very much like a judicial proceeding.”97  As for the logic 
prong, the Sixth Circuit concluded that, pursuant to Richmond Newspapers and 
its progeny, public access to deportation hearings would meet the logic prong, 
as public access would help to ensure fairness of the proceedings by pressuring 
the government to carry out its duties properly.98  Additionally, the Sixth Circuit 
held that opening such proceedings to the public in this context could provide 
for “public catharsis” in the wake of the September 11th attacks.99  Further, the 
Sixth Circuit stated that having such proceedings open would enhance public 
perception of the proceedings’ fairness and would inform citizens about the 
inner workings of government.100 
                                                          
 90. See Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066–67 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179. 
 91. See Detroit Free Press Court v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683–85 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that deportation hearings are presumptively open under a Richmond Newspapers analysis); see also 
N. Jersey Media Grp. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 201–02 (3d. Cir. 2002) (finding the Richmond 
Newspapers test unsatisfied). 
 92. 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 93. Id. at 682–83. 
 94. See id. at 695–96. 
 95. See id. at 701. 
 96. See id. at 701–02. 
 97. Id. at 702 (paraphrasing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 744 
(2002)). 
 98. See id. at 703–05. 
 99. See id. at 704. 
 100. See id. at 704–05. 
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b.  North Jersey Media Group: Deportation Hearings Do Not Satisfy 
“Experience and Logic” 
The Third Circuit, in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft,101 agreed 
with the Sixth Circuit that access to deportation hearings should be examined 
under the “experience and logic” test.102  The Third Circuit, however, held that 
there was not a sufficient history of open deportation hearings to support an 
argument that the experience prong of the Richmond Newspapers test was 
met.103  While conceding that the experience prong did not necessarily require 
an extensive centuries-long historical examination, the court, nonetheless, called 
for a “rigorous experience test” regarding access to administrative 
proceedings.104  According to the Third Circuit, any policy to the contrary would 
undermine the long-standing flexibility given to administrative agencies in 
conducting their own business by their own rules.105  Nonetheless, the court did 
not prescribe a bright-line rule for how to establish history sufficient to meet the 
“experience” prong.106 
In evaluating the logic prong, the court admitted that deportation hearings 
resembled judicial trials, but found the logic prong unsatisfied for other 
reasons.107  The court did not dispute that openness of such hearings would likely 
serve the “public benefit” in a number of ways as described under Richmond 
Newspapers and its progeny.108  Rather, the Third Circuit invoked a balancing 
test focusing on a number of concerns raised by the government, all centered on 
the concern that opening such hearings could undermine the government’s 
ability to fight terrorism.109  While the concern that opening such a proceeding 
to the public undermines the ability of the government to combat terrorism is 
                                                          
 101. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 102. See id. at 206–09 (stating “Richmond Newspapers is a test broadly applicable to issues of 
access to government proceedings, including removal”). 
 103. See id. at 211. 
 104. See id. at 213, 216. 
 105. See id. at 216. 
 106. See id. (“By insisting on a strong tradition of public access in the Richmond Newspapers 
test, we preserve administrative flexibility and avoid constitutionalizing ambiguous, and potentially 
unconsidered, executive decisions.”). 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. at 217. 
 109. See id. at 218–19.  The concerns expressed by the North Jersey Media Group court 
include: (1) “reveal[ing] sources and methods of investigation”; (2) creating opportunities for 
terrorists to “exploit weaknesses” in the national security apparatus; (3) putting terrorist prisoners 
on notice about what information the United States does or does not have about them; (4) if 
terrorists know a member is being subjected to a hearing, they may accelerate a particular attack in 
order to carry it through before the government discovers the plot; (5) allowing terrorist groups the 
opportunity to interfere with evidence needed for the hearing; (6) the privacy rights of those 
subjected to such hearings; and (7) the impracticality of closing such hearings on a case-by-case 
basis.  Id. 
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speculative, the court rationalized its holding stating “the Richmond Newspapers 
logic prong is unavoidably speculative.”110 
The Third Circuit avoided the Supreme Court’s command against closure 
based on speculative arguments by holding that such a bar existed only if a First 
Amendment right existed in the first place.111 
c.  Other Forms of Administrative Hearings Have Seen Mixed Results 
Other types of administrative proceedings have seen mixed results when the 
“experience and logic” test is applied.112  The Sixth Circuit, for example, found 
that administrative disciplinary adjudications at public universities could not 
satisfy the test because these proceedings have not been historically open to the 
public due to privacy concerns.113  The Sixth Circuit noted that opening such 
proceedings to the public would serve no useful purpose, as the policies at stake 
affect only the relationship between a particular student and the university.114  
Thus, the public value of opening criminal or civil trials was not found to be 
present in university adjudication.115 
The Second Circuit applied the “experience and logic” test to the adjudicative 
proceedings for violators of the New York City Transit Authority’s 
regulations.116  In finding the experience prong satisfied, the Second Circuit 
analogized the proceedings to the workings of a trial and noted that the 
administrative proceedings at issue determined whether an accused party 
violated a regulation and could be, as a result, punished by the force of a 
government entity.117  Before the inception of the administrative body, the court 
further elaborated, such hearings were historically conducted as traditional court 
proceedings, and those hearings were presumptively open to the public.118 
The Second Circuit agreed that public access would benefit the public’s 
interest, thereby satisfying the logic prong, because open proceedings would 
help to provide a sense of fairness and justice in determining whether individuals 
were rightfully punished by a governmental body.119  Because the transit 
authority is a governmental body, the Second Circuit found that open access to 
                                                          
 110. Id. at 219. 
 111. See id. at 219 n.14. 
 112. See infra notes 113–21 and accompanying text. 
 113. See United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 822–23 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 114. See id. at 822 (“[S]tudent disciplinary proceedings govern the relationship between a 
student and his or her university, not the relationship between a citizen and ‘The People.’”). 
 115. See id. at 823. (“We find that public access will not aid in the functioning of traditionally 
closed student disciplinary proceedings; accordingly, The Chronicle does not enjoy a qualified First 
Amendment right of access to such proceedings.”). 
 116. See N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 301–03 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
 117. See id. at 301. 
 118. See id. at 301–02. 
 119. See id. at 303. 
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its proceedings would also help to educate the public about the governmental 
process at play.120  As such, the public values present in trials were found to be 
present in transit authority hearings, satisfying the logic prong.121 
F.  Access to the Polling Place: The Next Frontier for Applying Richmond 
Newspapers 
As noted previously, the impetus for this Comment is whether the “experience 
and logic” test commands a presumption of openness to the governmental 
process at the polling place.122  The Third and Sixth Circuits, again, are split on 
this issue.123 
1.  Beacon Journal: Ohio Statute Restricting Press Access to the Polls 
Violated the First Amendment Rights of the Press 
In Beacon Journal Publishing Co., Inc. v. Blackwell,124 the Sixth Circuit 
examined whether the First Amendment rights of a newspaper were violated 
under an Ohio state law restricting access to the polling place by prohibiting 
anyone from coming within a certain distance of the entrance to the polling 
place, except to vote or work at the polls.125  Notably, the statute contained an 
exception for the press to have “reasonable access to a polling place,”126 but in 
late October 2004, Ohio’s Secretary of State, Ken Blackwell, issued a directive 
saying, “the statute’s prohibition applies to anyone.”127  As such, the Beacon 
Journal Publishing Company challenged the law as it was enforced.128  Ohio 
justified the law by citing “a compelling interest in making sure that voters vote 
freely and without intimidation.”129 
                                                          
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 302–03. 
 122. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 123. See PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2013); Beacon Journal Publ’g Co., 
Inc. v. Blackwell, 389 F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2004); see also infra notes 124–49 and accompanying 
text. 
 124. 389 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 125. See id. at 684; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.35(B)(1) (West 2014). 
Except as otherwise provided . . . no person who is not an election official, employee, 
observer, or police officer shall be allowed to enter the polling place during the election, 
except for the purpose of voting or assisting another person to vote as provided in section 
3505.24 of the Revised Code. 
Id. 
 126. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.35(B)(2).  “Notwithstanding any provision of this section 
to the contrary, a journalist shall be allowed reasonable access to a polling place during an election.  
As used in this division, ‘journalist’ has the same meaning as in division (B)(2) of section 2923.129 
of the Revised Code.”  Id. 
 127. Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 684. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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Pointing out that the newspaper’s intent was to report on the events taking 
place at the polling place on Election Day, and not to disturb the voting rights of 
Ohio citizens, the Sixth Circuit found strict scrutiny unsatisfied by the 
government, and that, therefore, the law unconstitutionally burdened the First 
Amendment rights of the press.130  Whether “experience and logic” provided the 
foundation for this holding is unclear from the court’s opinion.131  The Sixth 
Circuit, however, quotes Detroit Free Press, saying “[t]his [c]ourt has recently 
observed that ‘[d]emocracies die behind closed doors,’” and that “the public 
‘deputize[s] the press as the guardians of their liberty.’”132 
As such, the court hints, at minimum, that it considered the public values 
recognized in its earlier First Amendment right of access jurisprudence without 
explicitly saying so.133  Further, it suggests that it intended to build upon its 
Detroit Free Press jurisprudence.134 
2.  PG Publishing: Access to the Polling Place Does Not Satisfy the 
“Experience and Logic” Test 
The Third Circuit, in PG Publishing Co. v. Aichele,135 reviewed a press 
entity’s challenge to a Pennsylvania statute that required “[a]ll persons, except 
election officers, clerks, machine inspectors, overseers, watchers, persons in the 
course of voting, persons lawfully giving assistance to voters, and peace and 
police officers . . . remain at least ten (10) feet distant from the polling place 
during the progress of the voting.”136  First noting a public right of access exists 
generally within the First Amendment, the Third Circuit then devoted several 
pages to the balancing test prescribed for the First Amendment right of access—
                                                          
 130. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend I) (finding the “fear of ‘turmoil that could be created by 
hordes of reporters and photographers’ is purely hypothetical and cannot, therefore, support 
[Ohio’s] proposed restriction of the First Amendment’s guarantee that state conduct shall not 
abridge ‘freedom . . . of the press’”). 
 131. It is not abundantly clear what test the Beacon Journal court applied to reach its 
conclusion.  See PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 112–13 (3d Cir. 2013) (averring that the 
Beacon Journal opinion failed to establish a “basis for its decision”).  In fact, the court in explaining 
its rationale uses neither the term “experience” nor “logic.”  See Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 685.  
Nevertheless, one can infer that the Sixth Circuit at least considered the Richmond Newspapers test, 
as the court cites to Detroit Free Press and remarks that the state’s purported justification for the 
law is “purely hypothetical and cannot, therefore, support Defendants’ proposed restriction.”  Id. 
 132. Beacon Journal, 389 F.3d at 685 (quoting Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 
683 (6th Cir. 2002)). 
 133. See id. (“With these principles in mind, we find that Plaintiffs present a strong likelihood 
of success on the merits of their challenge to Defendants’ enforcement of Blackwell’s directive.”). 
 134. See id. 
 135. 705 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 136. Id. at 95; 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3060(d) (2014). 
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ultimately leading to the “experience and logic” test prescribed by Richmond 
Newspapers and its progeny.137 
The court then detailed the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence on the “experience 
and logic” test, acknowledging that it had extended the analysis to governmental 
processes other than criminal trials, including civil trials and administrative 
proceedings.138  The court considered the “experience and logic” test the proper 
inquiry for analyzing a right of access to the polling place, as it involved “access 
to information about governmental bodies and their actions or decisions.”139  
Moreover, the Third Circuit had previously applied the “experience and logic” 
test to Article I and II proceedings, and held that voting is covered by Article 
I.140  The Third Circuit then evaluated voting under the experience prong. 
Because polling advanced from voice vote to secret ballot at the polling place 
since the founding of the United States, the Third Circuit concluded that no such 
long-standing history of openness to the polling place existed.141  The Third 
Circuit, finding the experience prong not satisfied, focused on the history of 
openness as viewed through the lens of the individual voter himself, rather than 
through the lens of the public’s right to information about the process in play.142 
In applying the logic prong, the court stated that it must balance both the 
benefits of opening the process to the public and press, as well as the potential 
harms of such openness.143  The Third Circuit conceded that openness could be 
useful in preventing voter fraud and in allowing the public to examine the 
fairness of the process.144  But in evaluating the harm, the court noted that the 
potential access of numerous reporters to the polling place, particularly when 
citizens were “necessarily exchanging personal information in preparation for 
casting a private vote, could concern, intimidate or even turn away potential 
voters.”145  Finding the “experience and logic” test unsatisfied, the Third Circuit 
                                                          
 137. See PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 98–99, 100–02.  The Third Circuit also devotes several 
pages to explaining that a right of access is not the same as a right to speech itself.  See id. at 99–
102. 
 138. See id. at 104–06. 
 139. Id. at 106–07 (“[A]ccess to information about governmental bodies and their actions or 
decisions—must be evaluated with an eye toward the historical and structural role of the 
proceeding.”). 
 140. See id. at 107 (“In North Jersey, we held that the ‘experience and logic’ test applies to 
government proceedings under Articles I and II of the Constitution.  Such proceedings include, 
among other things, the process of voting.”). 
 141. See id. at 109–10 (relying on Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200–05 (1992)). 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. at 111 (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 
2002)) (“Indeed, the logic analysis must account for the negative effects of openness, for otherwise 
‘it is difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which the public would not have a First 
Amendment right of access.’”). 
 144. See id. at 111–12. 
 145. Id. at 112. 
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concluded that no presumptive right of access to the polling place for the press 
existed.146 
Notably, the Third Circuit criticized the holding in Beacon Journal, stating 
that the Sixth Circuit inappropriately applied strict scrutiny under a “public 
forum access” test, instead of the appropriate “experience and logic” test.147  
According to the PG Publishing court, applying a “public forum access” analysis 
to the polling place—what the Third Circuit considered to be a nonpublic 
forum—could actually allow for less access to governmental proceedings than 
the Richmond Newspapers balancing test.148  The Third Circuit also noted that 
the only court decision that relied on the Beacon Journal court’s holding was, in 
fact, the district court decision under review in this case.149 
Even overlooking the potentially narrow historical inquiry undertaken by the 
Third Circuit,150 it remains difficult to understand how applying a lesser 
“reasonableness” standard of scrutiny to the government in polling place access 
legislation better prevents the very same government from “hid[ing] their 
activities from the public’s view” than a strict scrutiny standard.151 
II.  THE RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS TEST, WHEN APPLIED, SHOULD OPEN THE 
POLLING PLACE TO THE PRESS AND PUBLIC 
While it is not necessarily clear that the Sixth Circuit avoided the “experience 
and logic” test altogether in deciding Beacon Journal,152 the Third Circuit 
unambiguously relied upon the analytical framework, saying “access to 
government proceedings—in effect, access to information about governmental 
bodies and their actions or decisions—must be evaluated with an eye toward the 
historical and structural role of the proceeding.”153  One commentator recently 
argued that the use of the “experience and logic” test, in the manner the Third 
Circuit applied it, “properly framed the constitutional issue as a question of right 
of access to information, forestalled the government from potentially exploiting 
nonpublic fora, and protected contemporaneous First Amendment principles.”154  
                                                          
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. at 113. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. at 113 n.25; see also PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 902 F.Supp.2d 724, 754 (W.D. Pa. 
2012). 
 150. See First Amendment —Public Access —Third Circuit Holds that First Amendment Does 
Not Afford the Public a Protected Right of Access to Polling Places for News-Gathering 
Purposes.— PG Publishing Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1067 (2014) (believing 
the Third Circuit ignored “the long history of racial discrimination and disenfranchisement that has 
accompanied the closed polling process”). 
 151. See PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 113. 
 152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 153. PG Publ’g Co., 705 F.3d at 106–07. 
 154. Nicole Lessin, Voting for Balance: The Third Circuit Splits with the Sixth Circuit Over 
the Press’s Right to Access Polling Stations in PG Publishing Co. v. Aichele, 55 B.C. L. REV. E-
SUPPLEMENT 183, 192 (2014). 
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Indeed, simply understanding the framework’s applicability to the polling place 
is achievable by examining the polling place through the lens of Justice 
Brennan’s Richmond Newspapers concurrence.155 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence states “[f]irst, the case for a right of access has 
special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree 
to particular proceedings or information.”156  Justice Brennan further opined, 
“what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular government 
process is important in terms of that very process.”157  He then writes, “[t]o 
resolve the case before us . . . we must consult historical and current practice . . 
. and weigh the importance of public access.”158  Justice Brennan suggests that 
the test should be used for all governmental processes, not just trials, broadly 
characterizing trials as “a genuine governmental proceeding.”159 
A.  The “Experience and Logic” Test Is the Correct Test Because Voting Is a 
Government Process 
Article I of the Constitution states: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by 
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”160  The Supreme 
Court has stated that this Elections Clause gives states the power to “prescribe 
the procedural mechanisms for holding congressional elections.”161 
Most scholars, as well as the Supreme Court, agree that there is no explicit 
federal right to vote granted in the Constitution.162  Yet, the right of a citizen to 
vote has been directly addressed several times in amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution,163 and more specifically, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which 
                                                          
 155. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 156. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. at 595–96. 
 160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  The Seventeenth Amendment now overrides the final 
provision of Section 4, clause 1 regarding the “chusing of Senators.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  
As noted previously, voting rights and the controversial jurisprudence surrounding it in recent years 
are not the focus of this paper. 
 161. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001). 
 162. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 89, 91 (2014) (noting that the explicit right to vote is granted to citizens via the constitutions 
of their respective states). 
 163. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (constitutionalizing the popular election of 
U.S. Senators); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”); U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXIII, § 1 (granting electoral votes for President and Vice President to the District of 
Columbia); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote in 
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protects the rights of all citizens to vote regardless of race or color and bars the 
use of any “standard, practice, or procedure” to interfere with citizens’ voting 
rights.164  Judicially, any abridgement of the right to vote has been explicitly 
subjected to strict scrutiny.165  Voting, therefore, is clearly a government 
process, and access to it should be evaluated under the “experience and logic” 
test of Richmond Newspapers. 
B.  Experience and Logic Are Necessarily Satisfied When Applied to the 
Polling Place 
1.  Experience: It is Common Practice to Have “Others” in the Polling 
Place 
As the Court stated in El Vocero, when considering experience, a court should 
“not look to the particular practice of any one jurisdiction, but instead ‘to the 
experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout the United States.’”166  
                                                          
any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice 
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or 
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
age.”). 
 164. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2015). 
 165. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  The Carolene 
Court upheld the statute at issue under a deferential standard, but it noted a less deferential standard 
would be needed 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, 
such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held 
to be embraced within the Fourteenth.  It is unnecessary to consider now whether 
legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to 
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial 
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other 
types of legislation.  On restrictions upon the right to vote, on restraints upon the 
dissemination of information, on interferences with political organizations as to 
prohibition of peaceable assembly.  Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations 
enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial 
minorities; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
Id. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 
(1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon 
the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ 
restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of 
compelling importance.’ 
Id. 
 166. El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150 (1993) (quoting Rivera-Puig 
v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 F.2d 311, 323 (1st Cir. 1992)). 
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Though the El Vocero Court referred specifically to preliminary criminal 
hearings, Press-Enterprise II consistently refers to analyzing government 
“processes” under the “experience and logic” test.167 
a.  A Number of States Allow for Public and News Media Access Beyond 
Just Voters 
A survey of a number of states’ voting laws suggests that it is actually 
common practice to allow members of the public, as well as news media, into 
the polling place for purposes beyond simply casting a ballot.168  Virginia, 
Tennessee, and Oklahoma, for example, specifically allow members of the news 
media to enter the polling place, although there are reasonable limits placed on 
their access.169  Wisconsin permits entry to the polls rather broadly, allowing 
“[a]ny member of the public [to] be present at any polling place . . . or . . . 
[location where] absentee ballots may be cast.”170  The language of Nevada’s 
administrative code is similarly broad, allowing “any person [to] observe the 
conduct of voting at a polling place” subject only to minor restrictions.171 
                                                          
 167. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986). 
 168. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 681(4) (2014) (“If sufficient space exists, 
party workers and others, in addition to the pollwatchers allowed pursuant to section 627, may 
remain in the voting place outside the guardrail enclosure as long as they do not attempt to influence 
voters or interfere with their free passage.”) (emphasis added); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 7-112 (2014) 
(“[A] news reporter or photographer may, in the course of covering the election being conducted, 
be allowed inside the election enclosure for a period not to exceed five (5) minutes.”); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 2-7-103(a) (2014) (“No person may be admitted to a polling place while the procedures 
required by this chapter are being carried out except election officials, voters, persons properly 
assisting voters, the press, poll watchers appointed under § 2-7-104 and others bearing written 
authorization from the county election commission.”) (emphasis added); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-
604(J) (2014) (“The officers of election shall permit representatives of the news media to visit and 
film or photograph inside the polling place for a reasonable and limited period of time while the 
polls are open.”) (emphasis added); WIS. STAT. § 7.41(1) (2014) (“Any member of the public may 
be present at any polling place, in the office of any municipal clerk whose office is located in a 
public building on any day that absentee ballots may be cast in that office, or at an alternate site 
under § 6.855 on any day that absentee ballots may be cast at that site for the purpose of observation 
of an election and the absentee ballot voting process, except a candidate whose name appears on 
the ballot at the polling place or on an absentee ballot to be cast at the clerk’s office or alternate site 
at that election.”) (emphasis added).  The author of this article does not represent that this list of 
statutes is exhaustive.  Instead, in conducting a survey of such state statutes, the author, in the spirit 
of a “general” look at the “experience” in various jurisdictions, attempted to include a wide range 
of geographically and culturally diverse sections of the United States. 
 169. See select statutes cited supra note 168. 
 170. WIS. STAT. § 7.41(1) (2014). 
 171. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 293.245(1) (2014). 
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b.  “Poll Watchers” 
Moreover, numerous states allow for so-called “poll watchers” to be present 
in the polling places.172  These “poll watchers” are typically representatives of 
candidates seeking office or political parties.173  A number of state statutes 
specifically reference poll watchers and allow them to access the polls on behalf 
of candidates or political parties.174 
c.  When Examined Broadly—as Prescribed by the Supreme Court—
Access to the Polling Place Satisfies the “Experience” Prong 
History suggests a broad reading of the experience prong. In Globe 
Newspaper, the Supreme Court solidified Justice Brennan’s Richmond 
Newspapers concurrence, stating, “a tradition of accessibility implies the 
                                                          
 172. Gilda R. Daniels, Senator Edward Kennedy: A Lion for Voting Rights, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 415, 434–35 (2011) (noting that a number of states allow for so-called “poll 
watchers” or “challengers”); John Tanner, Effective Monitoring of Polling Places, 61 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 50, 77 (2009) (“There is a provision in each state for poll watchers appointed by political 
parties, candidates, or other groups, although their number, qualifications, and role varies 
considerably.”). 
 173. See Daniels, supra note 172, at 434–35; Tanner, supra note 172, at 77–78. 
 174. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 97.140(b) (2014) (“A party may be represented 
at the polling places by observers.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-408 (2014); ME. STAT. tit. 21, § 627(4) 
(2014) (“Municipalities must provide a polling place large enough to allow at least one worker 
from each political party to remain outside the guardrail enclosure as a pollwatcher.”) (emphasis 
added); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 10-311(a)(1) (West 2014) (“The following persons or 
entities have the right to designate a registered voter as a challenger or a watcher at each place of 
registration and election: (i) the State Board for any polling place in the State; (ii) a local board for 
any polling place located in the county of the local board; (iii) a candidate; (iv) a political party; 
and (v) any other group of voters supporting or opposing a candidate, principle, or proposition on 
the ballot.”) (emphasis added); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-13-120 (2014) (“The election judges shall 
permit one poll watcher from each political party to be stationed close to the poll lists in a location 
that does not interfere with the election procedures.”) (emphasis added); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 13-
13-121 (2014) (“A candidate, a group of candidates, or any group having an interest in the election 
may request the election administrator to allow additional poll watchers at any precinct.”); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-45(a) (West 2014) (granting the right of the chair of political parties, and 
campaign managers for unaffiliated candidates, the power to appoint poll watchers); tit. 19 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-19-22 (West 2014) (allowing for representatives, runners, and watchers 
from each political party to be present at the polling place and observe the voting process); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 2-7-104(a) (2014) (allowing political parties, citizen organizations, and candidates 
to have poll watchers present at the polling place); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (West 2014) 
(defining a “watcher” as “a person appointed under this subchapter to observe the conduct of an 
election on behalf of a candidate, a political party, or the proponents or opponents of a measure.”) 
(emphasis added); (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604(c) (2014) (“The officers of election 
shall permit one authorized representative of each political party or independent candidate in a 
general or special election, or one authorized representative of each candidate in a primary 
election, to remain in the room in which the election is being conducted at all times.”) (emphasis 
added).  Again, with this survey of state statutes and regulations, the author of this article does not 
represent the aforementioned laws to be an exhaustive list of state statutes and regulations regarding 
this matter.  Instead, the author has intended to provide examples of similar state statutes and 
regulations that represent a wide geographic and cultural diversity among jurisdictions. 
2015] Richmond Newspapers and the Right to Observe Elections 177 
favorable judgment of experience.”175  Justice Brennan’s concurrence, as some 
commentators suggest, sought to go beyond a mere number of years of openness 
and analyze the inherent or normative value of having such a process be open.176  
Other commentators suggest that, in applying the experience prong, the El 
Vocero Court, while exclusively analyzing the openness of preliminary hearings 
in Puerto Rico, further clarified that the experience test looks beyond the history 
of a particular jurisdiction or locality, and instead looks to prevailing laws across 
the United States—again, a judicial broadening of the experience inquiry.177 
The number of states that allow news media, members of the public, and poll 
watchers into the polls, as detailed previously, demonstrates that public access 
to the polling place, beyond that of the simple voter, is common and meets the 
“experience” prong, especially when applied broadly.178 
2.  Logic: The Public Interests at Stake Will Necessarily Be Enhanced by 
Public Access 
As detailed extensively above,179 the experience prong is not the end of the 
analysis—the logic prong remains.  In order to determine whether the logic 
prong is met, Richmond Newspapers and its progeny teach that a court must 
consider “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the 
functioning of the particular process in question.”180  Namely, courts must 
examine whether openness of the process in question would help ensure fairness 
of the process, promote the appearance of the process’ fairness, and provide 
citizens with enhanced confidence in the government.181 
a.  The Public Interests Are Analogous to Those Interests Already 
Determined to be Presumptively Open 
As detailed above, a presumption of openness to the public and the press in 
criminal trials and proceedings serves a number of valuable public interests, 
including: fairness to those subjected to criminal justice, the appearance of 
fairness to the public, a societal catharsis that justice and fairness have been 
                                                          
 175. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982) 
(quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring)). 
 176. See, e.g., First Amendment—Public Access—Third Circuit Holds that First Amendment 
Does Not Afford the Public a Protected Right of Access to Polling Places for News-Gathering 
Purposes, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1071–73 (2014). 
 177. See El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1993). 
 178. See supra Part II.B.1.a–b. 
 179. See supra Part I.C. 
 180. Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
 181. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). 
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carried out, and an enhancement of society’s confidence in the workings of its 
government.182 
Lower courts have extended this logic to civil trials on similar grounds: public 
scrutiny resulting in a greater likelihood of fairness to the parties involved, 
greater pressure on officials carrying out duties to do so in the proper manner, 
and enhancing the public’s awareness of its government and the processes in 
which it engages.183  In establishing the logic of allowing public and press 
attendance for administrative proceedings, lower courts have noted similar 
rationales: an assurance of fairness in the process, a catharsis of the public that 
justice and fairness have been properly administered, and education of the public 
about the workings of the government process in question.184  Further, as the 
Richmond Newspapers Court stated, praising the role the press plays in serving 
as a funnel of information to society,185 the public value served by access 
pertains not just to particular individuals, but also to the public as a whole.186 
Whether in criminal or civil trials, administrative hearings, or at the polling 
place, similar interests are at stake.  Voting is a fundamental right of citizens.187  
Many commentators, regardless of their stances on the overall correctness of 
such measures, agree that a number of new laws requiring voter identification 
have come to fruition in a number of states.188  Indeed, in 2008, the Supreme 
                                                          
 182. See supra Part I.C.; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570–
72 (1980); Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984). 
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have 
confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone 
is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that 
deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the 
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the 
system. 
Id.; see also Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 9. 
 183. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069–70 (3d Cir. 1984); see also 
supra Part I.E.1. 
 184. See supra Part I.E.2.; see also New York Civil Liberties Union v. New York City Transit 
Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 303 (2d Cir. 2011); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 703–05 (6th 
Cir. 2002). 
 185. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577 n.12. 
 186. See id. at 570–72. 
 187. See supra Part II.A. 
 188. See, e.g., Brandon S. Baker, Note, Texas v. Holder: How Texas Can Enact a Stringent 
Voter ID Law and Avoid Section 3(c) Clearance, 8 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 371, 377–86 (2014); David 
M. Faherty, Comment, The Post-Crawford Rise in Voter ID Laws: A Solution Still in Search of a 
Problem, 66 ME. L. REV. 269, 278–85 (2013); Claire Foster Martin, Comment, Block the Vote: 
How a New Wave of State Election Laws Is Rolling Unevenly Over Voters & the Dilemma of How 
to Prevent It, 43 CUMB. L. REV. 95, 103–10 (2013); Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, 
Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1865, 1872 
(2013); Joel A. Heller, Note, Fearing Fear Itself: Photo Identification Laws, Fear of Fraud, and 
the Fundamental Right to Vote, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1877–78 (2009); Hans A. von Spakovsky, 
Protecting the Integrity of the Election Process, 11 ELECTION L.J. 90, 90–91 (2012). 
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Court upheld voter identification laws in Indiana.189  Justifying its rationale, the 
Supreme Court noted, “flagrant examples of such fraud in other parts of the 
country have been documented throughout this Nation’s history by respected 
historians and journalists.”190 
Again, the same policy interests enumerated in judicial opinions appear in 
legal arguments both for and against voter rights law.  One commentator, in 
discussing the rise of new election laws in recent years, mentioned “a raft of new 
election laws that were passed by Republican-controlled legislatures and 
administrative actions taken mostly by Republican secretaries of state.  
Democrats and voting rights groups charged that these new laws and procedures 
made it harder for voters to register and cast their ballots.”191  In advocating for 
tough judicial scrutiny of voter identification laws, another commentator stated, 
“[p]hoto ID requirements make voting more difficult for some voters and 
impossible for others.”192  But another commentator, supporting voter 
identification laws, wrote, “[s]uch measures increase public confidence in our 
election process.”193  Indeed, as part of its justification for seeking access to the 
polls, the PG Publishing Company argued that a new voter identification law in 
Pennsylvania was a primary reason that the public needed full press access to 
the polling place.194 
More recently, in September 2014, the Seventh Circuit vacated the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin’s enjoinment of Wisconsin’s voter identification law.195  
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, in response, praised the ruling as protective 
of the voting process.196  Wisconsin Congresswoman Gwen Moore, by contrast, 
                                                          
 189. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008) (“In sum, on the basis 
of the record that has been made in this litigation, we cannot conclude that the statute imposes 
‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class of voters.”). 
 190. Id. at 195. 
 191. Hasen, supra note 188, at 1872. 
 192. Heller, supra note 188, at 1891. 
 193. Von Spakovsky, supra note 188, at 90. 
 194. PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 111–12 (3d Cir. 2013) The Third Circuit noted: 
Appellant argues that access to the polling place was particularly necessary during this 
past election because of the Voter ID Law.  More specifically, Appellant argues that the 
Voter ID Law—part of which was suspended for purposes of the November 6, 2012 
election—may have caused voter confusion as to whether identification is required in 
order to cast a vote.  As a result, Appellant argues that it was of the utmost importance 
for reporters to observe and record the goings on at the sign-in table during this election. 
Id. 
 195. Frank v. Walker, 766 F.3d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The panel has concluded that the 
state’s probability of success on the merits of this appeal is sufficiently great that the state should 
be allowed to implement its law, pending further order of this court.”). 
 196. Press Release, Office of Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, Governor Scott Walker 
Statement on Voter ID Ruling (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/newsroom/press-
release/governor-scott-walker-statement-voter-id-ruling (“This ruling is a win for the electoral 
process and voters of Wisconsin.  Voter ID is a common sense reform that protects the integrity of 
180 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:155 
criticized the decision as an attack on voters’ rights and the principles of 
democracy.197  Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit, reaching the merits, held 
Wisconsin’s voter ID law constitutionally valid in October 2014.198  Yet, only a 
few days later, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the law’s implementation.199 
Other states’ controversial voting laws have been the subject of recent federal 
cases.  For example, on October 9, 2014, a federal district court held in Veasey 
v. Perry200 that a Texas law mandating that voters produce photo ID in order to 
vote was an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote, as well as an 
unconstitutional poll tax.201  On October 14, 2014, the Fifth Circuit stayed the 
ruling pending an appeal.202  The Supreme Court left the stay in place, over a 
vigorous dissent from Justice Ginsburg, who wrote, “[t]he greatest threat to 
public confidence in elections in this case is the prospect of enforcing a 
purposefully discriminatory law, one that likely imposes an unconstitutional poll 
tax and risks denying the right to vote to hundreds of thousands of eligible 
voters.”203 
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that 
the law’s discriminatory effects violated the Voting Rights Act, while vacating 
the district court’s holding that the law had a discriminatory purpose, and that 
the law was a poll tax.204  Texas Governor Greg Abbott responded by stating, 
“[i]n light of ongoing voter fraud, it is imperative that Texas has a voter ID law 
that prevents cheating at the ballot box.  Texas will continue to fight for its voter 
ID requirement to ensure the integrity of elections in the Lone Star State.”205  In 
contrast, the lead plaintiff Texas Congressman Marc Veasey, applauded the 
ruling, stating “the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit has taken the first 
                                                          
our voting process.  It’s important that voters have confidence in the system.  Today’s ruling makes 
it easier to vote and harder to cheat.”). 
 197. Press Release, Office of U.S. Representative Gwen Moore, Gwen Moore Responds to 7th 
Circuit’s Ruling on Wisconsin Voter ID Law (Sept. 12, 2014), http://gwenmoore.house.gov/ 
press-releases/gwen-moore-responds-to-7th-circuits-ruling-on-wisconsins-voter-id-law1/ (“This 
decision is a grave injustice for those who lack the necessary photo identification that this law 
requires.  Creating unnecessary barriers at the polls, barriers that would significantly impact low-
income, elderly, and racial and ethnic minority voters, is a blatant violation of the basic principles 
of American democracy.”). 
 198. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 199. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7, 8 (2014). 
 200. 71 F.Supp.3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
 201. Id. at 633 (“The Court holds that SB 14 creates an unconstitutional burden on the right to 
vote, has an impermissible discriminatory effect against Hispanics and African-Americans, and 
was imposed with an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose.  The Court further holds that SB 14 
constitutes an unconstitutional poll tax.”) 
 202. Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 203. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 9–10 (2014). 
 204. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 519–20 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 205. Press Release, Office of Texas Governor Greg Abbott, Governor Abbott Statement on 
Texas Voter ID Law (Aug. 6, 2015), http://gov.texas.gov/news/press-release/21284. 
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steps towards ensuring that all Texans have unfettered access to the ballot 
box.”206 
Also, in October 2014, the Fourth Circuit remanded a case concerning a 
restrictive North Carolina voting law to the district court, instructing the district 
court to enforce the provisions in the law that prohibited same-day voter 
registration and counting votes cast in the wrong precinct.207  The Supreme 
Court stayed the Fourth Circuit ruling over a dissent from Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor.208 
The aforementioned cases, as well as the commentaries and statements in 
reaction to those cases, demonstrate that the public interests at stake regarding 
the polling place—notably fairness and the appearance of fairness to the 
public—are analogous to those considered by courts in applying the “experience 
and logic” test to criminal trials, civil trials, and administrative proceedings.  For 
example, both supporters and critics of increased scrutiny of voter eligibility 
echo the idea of fairness and justice in the voting process.209  Even the Supreme 
Court, divided over the merits of these state laws, stressed the potential threat of 
voter fraud, and the potential damage to the process’s fairness.210 
The sharp disagreements discussed above, moreover, suggest concerns by 
both sides about the perception of fair elections at the polling place.211  Unlike 
the closed proceedings in North Jersey Media Group and Miami University, 
secretive processes at the polling place will not serve government interests, nor 
are the interests at stake strictly and solely between individuals and a particular 
institution or entity.212 
b.  The Public Will Benefit from Scrutiny of the Government Process by 
the Press 
Because the fairness and the public perception of fairness are both implicated 
by the voting process, public access to the polling place, particularly by way of 
the press, will benefit the public, the voting process itself, and satisfy the logic 
prong.  As discussed previously, a number of states allow for “poll watchers,” 
who are individuals typically appointed by parties and candidates with interests 
in the outcome.213  “Poll watchers,” one particular group notes, “shine a partisan 
light on polling place procedures to prevent voter fraud—by the polling place 
                                                          
 206. Press Release, Office of U.S. Representative Marc Veasey, Rep. Veasey Statement on 
Texas Voter ID Ruling (Aug. 5, 2015), http://veasey.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/rep-
veasey-statement-on-texas-voter-id-ruling. 
 207. See League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 248–29 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 208. See North Carolina v. League of Women Voters, 135 S. Ct. 6, 6 (2014). 
 209. See supra notes 191–98 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 188–208 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra notes 101–21 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
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official, the putative voter, or a combination of both—from diluting legal 
votes.”214 
The press, in contrast to poll watchers, is defined broadly as “[t]he news 
media; print and broadcast news organizations collectively.”215  The press, in 
theory, does not have a dog in the fight.  Proclaimed “surrogates for the 
public,”216 the press is “designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses 
of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for 
keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they 
were selected to serve.”217 
If persons with a known interest in the outcome of an election can be allowed 
into polling places, members of the press should likewise have a presumptive 
First Amendment right to view the process.  The attachment of a qualified First 
Amendment presumption for the press to access polling places, justifiably 
identical to notions of fairness at criminal trials, civil trials, and administrative 
proceedings, will likewise benefit society at large. 
C.  There Are Appropriate Checks in Place to Protect Against Adverse Effects 
of Allowing Public and Press Access to the Polling Place 
A presumptive First Amendment right of access does not have to signal a 
mandate for mayhem at the polls.  First, many of the statutes previously 
discussed that specifically allow for public and press access, have safety 
mechanisms built into them.218  Second, courts that apply the “experience and 
logic” test generally remind readers that a presumptive right of access is not an 
absolute right.219  Third, the closure or restriction on access of a presumptively 
open governmental process can be judicially approved if strict scrutiny is met.220 
The Virginia statute, for example, allows for the news media to enter the 
polling place, while specifically prohibiting the media from filming voters 
                                                          
 214. Heather Heidelbaugh, Logan Fisher & James Miller, Protecting the Integrity of the 
Polling Place: A Constitutional Defense of Poll Watcher Statutes, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 217, 218 
(2009) (arguing, generally, that poll watcher statutes are constitutional); see also Tanner, supra 
note 172, at 79. He notes: 
There is potential for the perception of bias on the part of monitors, and many people 
who are willing to spend hours at the polls will have a dearly-loved dog in the fight.  
Others will monitor due to an interest in improvement of the election process.  In the 
latter case, it is preferable, where good-government or academic sponsorship is not 
permitted, for the monitors to be associated with as neutral a candidate or organization 
as possible. 
Id. 
 215. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (9th ed. 2009). 
 216. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980). 
 217. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). 
 218. See supra Part II.B.1.a–b. 
 219. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581; see also Press Enter. Co. v. Superior 
Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986). 
 220. See Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). 
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without their permission. 221  The Virginia statute also prohibits filming in a 
manner that could potentially reveal anyone’s vote.222  Many of the poll watcher 
statutes have similar safety mechanisms protecting voters.223  Such limitations 
may be instructive, informing states how to properly limit the scope of the 
media’s qualified right of access.  Most importantly, the Supreme Court has 
assured, if any limitation on access can pass strict scrutiny, a court can uphold 
that limitation on this qualified right.224 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The well-established dual-pronged test of “experience and logic” exists to 
guide courts in determining whether a qualified First Amendment presumptive 
right of access to government processes exists.  Historically, there are a number 
of instances throughout the United States in which “outsiders” other than 
ordinary voters are permitted to enter the polling place.  Logically, the interests 
at stake in the polling place, particularly fairness and the public’s perception of 
fairness, are analogous to those interests that provide for a constitutional 
presumptive right of access to a myriad of governmental processes.  As this is a 
qualified right of access, proper limitations, if they pass strict scrutiny, may be 
put in place.  As such, experience and logic mandate attaching a qualified First 















                                                          
 221. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604(J) (2015); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 7-112 
(West 2014) (limiting the time and specific observations reporters may make of particular voters at 
the polls). 
 222. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604(J) (2015). 
 223. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-408(d) (2014) (prohibiting poll watchers from speaking 
to voters, trying to influence voters, or otherwise interfering with the voting process and providing 
for their removal if they do); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-45(c) (West 2014) (prohibiting poll 
watchers from electioneering or interfering with the voting process). 
 224. See Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 9.  
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